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THE DEATH OF SECURED LENDING
EdwardJ.Janger*

INTRODUCTION

Historically and culturally, secured lenders have seen the
Bankruptcy Code, bankruptcy lawyers, and bankruptcy scholars as the
enemy.' And they have had reason to worry. Scholars such as Lynn
LoPucki, with his proposed priority for tort claims, 2 and Lucian
Bebchuck, Jesse Fried 3 and Elizabeth Warren, 4 with their proposal to
recreate Gilmore's late lamented equity cushion,5 would each undercut
the ability of lending lawyers to offer inviolate security interests to their
clients. On the legislative side, as well, the thrust and parry has been
* Professor of Law, Brooklyn Law School. Copyright © 2003 Edward J. Janger. All Rights
Reserved. Thanks to Dana Brakman-Reiser, Neil Cohen, Jonathan Lipson, David Reiss, Steve
Schwarcz, Paul Schwartz, Elizabeth Warren, Spencer Webber Waller, and the participants in the
Cardozo Law Review Symposium, Threats to Secured Lending and Asset Securitization, for
comments on an earlier draft. Thanks also to W. Hardy Callcott, Ken Kettering, Lynn LoPucki,
and Jay Westbrook for, at various points, helping me flesh out the arguments contained in this
Article.
Special thanks to Jonathan Alwais, Samantha Better, Matt Cohen, and Sandra
Rampersaud for essential research assistance,
I See, e.g., Steven H. Nickles, Consider Process Before Substance, Commercial Law
Consequences of the Bankruptcy System: Urging the Merger of the Article 9 Drafting Committee
and the Bankruptcy Commission, 69 AM. BANKR. L.J. 589, 589 (1995) ("Bankruptcy is fueled by
equity. It breathes equity, as fire breathes air. As the bankruptcy fire has spread, commercial law
has responded by taking away the fuel of equity by increasing liens.").
2 Lynn M. LoPucki, The Unsecured Creditor's Bargain, 80 VA. L. REV. 1887 (1994); see
also Robert K. Rasmussen, Debtor's Choice: A Menu Approach to CorporateBankruptcy, 71
TEX. L. REV. 51, 64-66 (1992).
3 Lucian Ayre Bebchuk & Jesse M. Fried, The Uneasy Case for the Priority of Secured
Claims in Bankruptcy, 105 YALE L.J. 857, 909-11 (1996) (proposing a "fixed-fraction" priority
rule).
4 See, e.g., Elizabeth Warren, Article 9 Set Aside for Unsecured Creditors,UCC BULL., Oct.
1996, at 1.
5 Grant Gilmore, The Good Faith Purchase Idea and the Uniform Commercial Code:
Confessions of a Repentant Draftsman, 15 GA. L. REV. 605, 620 (1981); cf. U.C.C. § 9-204 cmt. 4
(1972) (amended 1998):
The widespread nineteenth century prejudice against the floating charge was based on a
feeling, often inarticulate in the opinions, that a commercial borrower should not be
allowed to encumber all his assets present and future, and that for the protection not
only of the borrower but of his other creditors a cushion of free assets should be
preserved. That inarticulate premise has much to recommend it.
Id.
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between bankruptcy 6 and secured credit. 7 Bankruptcy partisans view
the recent revisions to Article 9 as shifting previously settled allocation
of property and regulatory rights8 in favor of secured creditors, and
against unsecured creditors such as employees, tort claimants and other
disorganized interests. I suspect that I was invited to participate in this
symposium because I fall into this group, as I have previously
questioned the ability of the UCC drafting process to handle such
distributive choices effectively. 9
This Article, however, makes a different point. It suggests that
while the fans of secured credit have been worrying about federal
bankruptcy legislation and in particular bankruptcy courts, 10 they have
been missing the real threat to secured lending as an institution, and,
perhaps, to Article 9 as a relevant source of law. The real danger may
come not from the rights-invading, autonomy-limiting world of
bankruptcy, but from the rights-sanctifying, autonomy-enhancing world
of non-uniform state property law.
The title of this symposium is "Threats to Secured Lending and
Asset Securitization." This title assumes that both institutions face
common threats. In this Article, I challenge that basic assumption. In
my view, the biggest threat to secured lending is asset securitization
itself-and securitization is on the march. Statutes have recently been
adopted in Alabama,"1 Delaware,12 Louisiana,13 Ohio,14 North
6 See Employee Abuse Prevention Act of 2002 (also known as the Durbin-Delahunt bill),
H.R 5221, 107th Cong. §§ 103, 203.
7 William M. Burke, et al., Report on Avoidance, Subordination, Super Priority, and
Recharacterization Provisions of the Proposed Employee Abuse Prevention Act of 2002 (Sept. 3,
2002) [hereinafter Durbin-Delahunt Report], at http://www.hewm.com/use/articles/durbindelahunt.pdf (last visited April 10, 2004).
8 See, e.g., G. Ray Warner, The Anti-Bankruptcy Act: Revised Article 9 and Bankruptcy, 9
AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 3, 4 (2001); Elizabeth Warren, Making Policy with Imperfect
Information: The Article 9 Full Priority Debates, 82 CORNELL L. REV. 1373, 1392 (1997);
Kenneth N. Klee, Barbariansat the Trough: Riposte in Defense of the Warren Carve-Out
Proposal,82 CORNELL L. REV. 1466, 1476-77 (1997); cf William J. Woodward, Jr., The Realist
and Secured Credit: Grant Gilmore, Common-Law Courts, and the Article 9 Reform Process, 82
CORNELL L. REV. 1511 (1997). I weigh in briefly on this point elsewhere in this Symposium.
See Edward J. Janger, The Reliance Interest in Insolvency Law: A Response to Harris and
Mooney, 25 CARDOZO L. REV. 1895 (2004).
9 Edward J. Janger, PredictingWhen the Uniform Law Process Will Fail:Article 9, Capture,
and the Race to the Bottom, 83 IOWA L. REV. 569 (1998) [hereinafter Janger, Uniform Law
Process].
10 Compare Douglas G. Baird, Bankruptcy's UncontestedAxioms, 108 YALE L.J. 573 (1998),
with Edward J. Janger, Crystals and Mud in Bankruptcy Law: JudicialCompetence and Statutory
Design, 43 ARIZ. L. REV. 559 (2001) [hereinafter Janger, Crystals andMud]; see also Christopher
W. Frost, Bankruptcy RedistributivePolicies and the Limits of the JudicialProcess, 74 N.C. L.
REV. 75, 99 (1995) (arguing that bankruptcy judges are not institutionally well situated to take
community interests into account).
11 ALA. CODE § 35-1OA-2(a)(1) (2003).
12 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, §§ 2701A-2703A (2003).
13 LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 10:9-109(e) (2003).
14 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1109.75 (2003).
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Carolina,15 South Dakota,' 6 and Texas, 17 that gerrymander state property
law to provide a safe harbor for securitization transactions, provide an
opt-out from Article 9's regulatory scheme, and provide an advantage to
Wall Street-style structured finance at the expense of Main Street-style
secured lending.18 More troubling yet, the adoption in Revised Article 9
of choice of law rules that locate corporate debtors in their state of
incorporation 19 may have turned secured lending into a lever in the
15 N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 53-425, 53-426 (2004).
16 S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 54-1-10 (2003).
17 TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 9.109(e) (2004).
18 For this insight-and also the Wall Street/Main Street metaphor-I am indebted to Ken
Kettering of New York Law School, who first made this point in a letter to the House/Senate
Conferees on Section 912 of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 2001. Letter from Ken Kettering,
Associate Professor of Law, New York Law School, to U.S. Sen. Patrick Leahy and U.S. Rep. F.
James Sensenbrenner, (Feb. 5, 2002) [hereinafter Kettering Letter], reprinted in EMERGING
ISSUES IN WORKOUTS AND BANKRUPTCIES 2004, at 57 (Joseph Samet ed., 2004) [hereinafter
EMERGING ISSUES]. Section 912 was included in various versions of the Bankruptcy Reform
Acts proposed between 1998 and 2001; the provision was removed in early 2002 after a number
of law professors (including both Kettering and myself) wrote the Conferees expressing their
reservations about the provision. See Letter from Allan Axelrod, Professor Emeritus, Rutgers
School of Law, et al., to U.S. Sen. Patrick Leahy and U.S. Rep. F. James Sensenbrenner (Jan. 23,
2002), reprinted in EMERGING ISSUES, supra, at 63; Letter from Edward J. Janger, Associate
Professor of Law, Brooklyn Law School, et al., to U.S. Sen. Patrick Leahy and U.S. Rep. F.
James Sensenbrenner (Jan. 28, 2002) [hereinafter Janger Letter], reprintedin EMERGING ISSUES,
supra, at 71; Letter from Jonathan C. Lipson, Assistant Professor of Law, University of
Baltimore, et al., to U.S. Sen. Patrick Leahy and U.S. Rep. F. James Sensenbrenner (Feb. 1,
2002), reprintedin EMERGING ISSUES, supra, at 53. In his letter Professor Kettering states:
Section 912 is special interest legislation that creates an unlevel playing field for
different methods of capital formation that are economically fungible and that should
be on equal footing in bankruptcy. It permanently bestows a large advantage to capital
formation a la Wall Street (i.e., securitization) over capital formation a la Main Street
(i.e., simple secured lending). Specifically, section 912 relieves from the burdens of
bankruptcy law a transaction that is in economic effect a secured loan, so long as that
transaction is structured as a securitization-but those legal burdens will continue to
fall with unabated weight on a simple secured loan of the kind traditionally made by
Main Street lenders (i.e., commercial banks and finance companies).
Kettering letter, supra. Kettering's analysis (in his letter) and mine (in this article) diverge on
two points. He focuses on how securitization frees investors in asset backed securities from the
burdens of bankruptcy, and while I agree with Kettering on this point, I focus here on how
securitization frees ABS investors even from the regulatory burdens of Article 9. See infra text
accompanying notes 30-34, 54-77. Also, and more importantly, we differ over whether the
appropriate response to this discrimination is to subject both secured loans and non-true sale
securitizations to the burdens of Article 9 and Title 11, or to free both forms of financing from
bankruptcy's burdens. Kettering is ambivalent. I am not. Kettering states:
Whether the legal burdens to which secured lenders are subject under the current
bankruptcy law are too heavy or not heavy enough is a question about which there is
disagreement. But it is not rational to impose those burdens upon a simple secured
loan while excluding from those burdens an elaborately and expensively structured
securitization transaction which, when viewed as a whole, is effectively fungible with a
simple secured loan.
Kettering Letter, supra. In contrast, I believe there are strong efficiency-based reasons for giving
bankruptcy judges the power to determine when and whether an adequately protected secured
creditor should be allowed to liquidate its collateral. Janger, Crystals and Mud, supra note 10.
19 Revised U.C.C. § 9-301 (2001). See generally Ingrid Michelsen Hillinger & Michael G.
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competition of states for corporate charters. 20
This Article is divided into five parts. In Part I, I seek to show that
the line between "true sales" and "sales intended as security" is not a
trivial, arcane doctrine which exists merely to frustrate efficient deals
and increase the cost of credit. Instead, I argue that the distinction has a
crucial regulatory component that enhances both financial transparency
and helps maintain proper investment incentives. In Part II, I describe
recent federal (unsuccessful) and state law (successful) initiatives to
broadly undercut the "intended as security" doctrine (also known as the
true sale doctrine). In Part III, I seek to show how these state statutes
pose a danger to Revised Article 9 as a statute and secured lending as an
institution. In Part IV, I explain how Article 9's own choice of law
provisions turn state property law into a lever in the competition for
corporate charters. I then argue that this competition is likely to lead to
a race to the bottom that will inevitably advantage securitization at the
expense of secured lending. I then explore whether the solution to the
property definition problem can best-indeed, can only-be handled
through federal law. Finally, Part V examines possible federal
legislative and common law solutions, and suggests that bankruptcy and
secured lending are indeed natural allies in pursuit of a federal law of
"true sale."
I. THE IMPORTANCE OF THE DOCTRINE OF TRUE SALE
My concern in this article is state law attempts to shift the line
between secured lending and structured finance by manipulating, or
'22
2
indeed eliminating, the line between "security interests" ' and "sales.
Hillinger, 2001: A Code Odyssey (New Dawn for the Article 9 Secured Creditor), 106 COM. L.J.
105, 123-136 (2001) (discussing Revised Article 9's choice-of-law rules).
20 See Janger, Uniform Law Process, supra note 9, at 625 ("As in prior law, no bifurcation
exists for accounts, general intangibles, and mobile goods. Furthermore, corporations may
choose to locate assets where a favorable rule exists. Thus, the amendment does not eliminate the
race to the bottom entirely .. ") (footnotes omitted). Revised Article 9 may actually increase the
likelihood of a race to the bottom by shifting filing for corporate debtors from the location of their
chief executive offices to their state of incorporation. While the law regarding the effect of
perfection for tangible goods is the law of the jurisdiction where the collateral is located, for
intangible goods-the types of assets that are frequently subject to securitization-the effect of
perfection is governed by the law of the jurisdiction where the debtor is located. Revised U.C.C.
§ 9-301. Corporate debtors are deemed located in the jurisdiction where they are incorporated.

Id. § 9-307. It is much easier for a debtor to change its state of incorporation than to move its
chief executive offices. Thus, Delaware can compete for corporate charters by adopting a rule
favorable to securitizations. Indeed, this appears to be exactly what it has done (at least with

regard to intangible assets) by enacting the Asset Backed Securitization Facilitation Act.
21 U.C.C. § 1-201(37) (1998). Note, the American Law Institute and the National Conference
of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws have recently promulgated a revised version of Article
1 of the Uniform Commercial Code. The relevant provision in Revised Article I is § 1-201(35)
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The core of this concern can be seen in the tension between two
sentences. The first sentence can be found in section 9-109(a)(1) of the
Uniform Commercial Code:
Except as otherwise provided in subsections (c) and (d), this article
applies to: (1) a transaction, regardless of its form, that creates a
security interest in personal property or fixtures by contract .... 23
When read against Article 9's definition of "security interest" as a
property interest which secures "payment or performance of an
obligation," 24 this provision tells us that any conveyance of personal
property that secures a debt will be treated as a security interest,
whether that conveyance is denominated a "lien," a "conditional sale," a
"sale," a "mortgage," or a "lease."
The rules for characterizing
conveyances, other than leases,25 are not stated in the U.C.C., and, as
Comment 4 to 9-109 expressly states, the inquiry is "left to the
courts. '26 Courts, in turn, 27 treat a conveyance as a sale only if the
(2004), which makes no substantive changes to the relevant portion of the former section.
Because, as of this writing, Revised Article 1 has only been adopted in Idaho, Texas, the U.S.
Virgin Islands, and Virginia, this article will retain references to former Article 1, except where
specified. Current information on the enactment b:atus of Revised Article 1 can be found at the
NCCUSL website: http://www.nccusl.org/nccusl/DesktopDefault.aspx (last visited Apr. 1, 2004).
22 Article 9 does not define the term "sale," but leaves the question to the courts. U.C.C. § 9109 cmt. 4; see also infra text accompanying notes 24-26, and note 28. Article 2, however,
defines a sale of goods as "the passing of title from the seller to the buyer for a price." U.C.C. §
2-106.
23 Revised U.C.C. § 9-109(a).
24 U.C.C. § 1-201(37) ("an interest in personal property... which secures payment or
performance of an obligation"). Article 9 also covers the sale of certain financial assets. Whether
the scope and definitional provisions of Article 9 carry with them an implicit and independent
power to look past the form of a transaction to its substance is open to question. Comment 4 to §
9-109 does not provide an unambiguous answer; while acknowledging that Article 9 "applies to
sales of accounts and chattel paper," it points out that "[iun many commercial financing
transactions the distinction is blurred," and then punts, stating: "Although this Article
occasionally distinguishes between outright sales of receivables and sales that secure an
obligation, neither this Article nor the definition of 'security interest' (Section 1-201(37))
delineates how a particular transaction is to be classified. That issue is left to the courts."
Revised U.C.C. § 9-109 cmt. 4 (emphasis added). Thus, in order to administer Article 9 it is
sometimes necessary to "distinguish" between "outright sales" and "sales that secure an
obligation," (or "sales intended as security"). However, Revised Article 9 does not "delineate[]
how" to make this distinction. Id. On some level this question is purely metaphysical. Every
state has a law of "true sale," which distinguishes between true sales and disguised security
interests; conceptually, Article 9 could simply sit on top of that non-uniform law. Alternatively,
the "regardless of form" language, coupled with Comment 4's statement that the "issue is left to
the courts," can be read as an injunction, within Article 9, to create a judge-made state law of true
sale. For the purposes of this Article it is not necessary to resolve this question, since in any
event the content of the law of true sale will be left to the courts of the various states, unless it is
supplanted by statutes of the type discussed supra notes 11-17.
25 Indeed, even though § 1-201(37) spells out the borders of the sale/lease distinction in
exhaustive detail, this provision leaves substantial room for judicial intervention based upon the
economic realities of the "facts of each case." U.C.C. § 1-201(37).
26 See sources cited supra notes 22 and 24. To distinguish a loan from a sale, courts look to a
number of factors, including:
(i) residual interest retained by the transferor, (ii) transfer price set at a fair market
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transaction truly transfers the risks and benefits of ownership to the
28
purchaser.
The second sentence can be found in the Asset Backed Securities
Facilitation Act, recently enacted in Delaware (the "Delaware ABS
Statute"), and in various forms in other states: "[n]otwithstanding any
other provision of law... [a]ny property, assets or rights purported to
be transferred, in whole or in part, in [a] securitization transaction shall
be deemed to no longer be the property, assets or rights of the
transferor .... "29

value ... , (iii) recourse to the asset transferor, (iv) acquisition of dominion and control
over the assets by the transferee, (v) the transfer of the benefits and burdens of
ownership by the transferee, and (vi) the intent of the parties as expressed in their
writings.
Lois R. Lupica, Revised Article 9, the Proposed Bankruptcy Code Amendments and Securitizing
Debtors and Their Creditors, 7 FORDHAM J. OF CORP. & FIN. L. 321, 330 (2001); see also, e.g.,
Major's Furniture Mart, Inc. v. Castle Credit Corp., 602 F.2d 538, 542-44 (3d Cir. 1979) (listing
factors relevant to true sale determination); In re Coronet Capital Co., 142 Bankr. 78 (Bankr.
S.D.N.Y. 1992) (transferor continued to pay interest on default of principal); In re Evergreen
Valley Resort, Inc., 23 B.R. 659 (Bankr. D. Me. 1982) (debtor/transferor's retained interest led to
characterization as a loan); In re Hurricane Elkhom Coal Corp., 19 B.R. 609 (Bankr. W.D. Ky.
1982) (debtor's retained interest); Federated Dep't Stores, Inc. v. Comm'r, 51 T.C. 500 (1968),
aff'd, 426 F.2d 417 (6th Cir. 1970) (recourse retained by transferor led to characterization as a
loan); cf Fireman's Fund Ins. Cos. v. Grover (In re Woodson Co.), 813 F.2d 266, 272 (9th Cir.
1987) (retention of risk, and recourse for interest suggested a loan rather than a sale).
27 With a few exceptions, see infra note 32.
28 See supra note 26. Article 9's terminology confuses this distinction somewhat, because
true sales of certain financial assets-accounts, chattel paper, payment intangibles and promissory
notes-are also governed by Article 9, pursuant to Revised U.C.C. § 9-109(a)(3) (stating that
Article 9 applies to "a sale of accounts, chattel paper, payment intangibles, or promissory notes"),
and are even referred to as "security interests" (which includes "any interest ... of a buyer of
accounts, chattel paper, a payment intangible, or a promissory note in a transaction that is subject
to Article 9."). U.C.C. § 1-201(37). There are, nonetheless, significant ramifications, even under
Article 9, of classification as either an "interest in property which secures payment or
performance of an obligation," or a "sale of accounts, chattel paper, payment intangibles, or
promissory notes." Revised U.C.C. § 9-109(a). For examples of sections where the distinction
makes a difference, see sections 9-209 (duty to notify account debtor of an assigned account of
release), 9-309(3)-(4) (no filing required for sale of payment intangible or promissory note), 9318(a) (seller of accounts, chattel paper, payment intangibles or promissory notes retains no
interest), 9-318(b) (deemed rights of seller of accounts or chattel paper). Additionally, sections 9323 (priority of future advances), 9-406 (anti-assignment override ineffective with regard to
"sales" of payment intangibles and promissory notes), 9-408 (anti-assignment override for
security interests in payment intangibles and promissory notes limited to security interests which
arise out of sales), 9-608 (no right to surplus or liability for deficiency if underlying transaction is
a sale (collection of rights to payment)), and 9-615(d) (no right to surplus or liability for
deficiency if underlying transaction is a sale (disposition of collateral)) also require a court to
distinguish a secured loan from a sale of assets covered by Article 9, and specify different
treatment for the collateral.
29 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 2703A(a)(l) (2003). A virtually identical statute has been
enacted in Alabama. See ALA. CODE § 35-IOA-2 (2003). A statute with virtually identical
operative language but with an arguably more specific definition of securitization has been
enacted in South Dakota. See S.D. CODIFIED LAWS §§ 54-1-9, 54-1-10 (2003). A slightly
narrower version was recently enacted in North Carolina. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 53-426 (2004).
The operational sentence is the same in North Carolina, but the term securitization transaction is
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The impact of the second sentence is to strip courts of the power
granted, or more accurately, preserved, 3° by the first. Under the
Delaware ABS Statute, any document contained in a "securitization
transaction"-whatever that may be 3'-which purports to transfer assets
(apparently of any type whatsoever), whether intended as a sale or a
security interest, will be effective to transfer ownership.
In short, under the UCC, the question of whether a sale is treated as
a sale is left to the courts. While some courts focus purely on the stated
more limited, only applying to sales of financial assets to special purpose entities which issue
publicly sold securities which receive an investment grade rating. Id. § 53-466(3). Ohio's statute
is, in effect, limited to securitizations by federally insured banks. See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §
1109.75 (2003). Finally, Texas and Louisiana have each enacted non-uniform versions of U.C.C.
§ 9-109. The Texas statute provides that "parties' characterization of a transaction as a sale of []
assets shall be conclusive that the transaction is a sale." TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. §
9.109(e) (2004). The Louisiana statute provides that "in the absence of fraud or intentional
misrepresentation, the parties' characterization of a transaction as a sale of accounts, chattel
paper, payment intangibles, or promissory notes shall be conclusive that the transaction is a true
sale and is not a secured transaction and that title has passed to the party characterized as the
purchaser." LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 10:9-109(e) (2003),
30 Judicial policing of "true sales" predates Article 9. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONTRACTS
§ 529 (1932) states:
Where the intent of a party to a bargain is to make a loan of money or an extension of
the maturity of a pecuniary debt for a greater profit than is allowed by law, the
agreement is illegal though the transaction is put in whole or in part in the form of a
sale, a contract to sell or other contract.
Id; see also Benedict v. Ratner, 268 U.S. 353 (1925) (treating assignment of accounts as an
unperfected secured loan); Obendorffv. Wolfson, 228 N.Y.S.2d 240 (N.Y. App. Div. 1964) ("In
this action upon written agreements for the sale of stock, requiring the seller, at the purchaser's
option, to repurchase the stock at an advanced price, there are issues of fact concerning the usury
defense which cannot be resolved by summary judgment."). Justice Brandeis, writing for the
Court in Benedict, appears to have understood the link between true sale and transparency,
discussed infra Part I.D. See Edward J. Janger, Brandeis, Progressivism, and Commercial Law:
Rethinking Benedict v. Ratner, 37 BRANDEIS L.J. 63, 76 (1998-99) ("[Bjy requiring creditor
monitoring, Brandeis, in effect, turned the institution of secured credit into a disclosure device.
The creditor had to monitor, the debtor had to disclose, and all of the creditors benefited."). As
Grant Gilmore explained:
It is clear that a lender who scrupulously adhered to [] Benedict-inspired practices as all
the professionals did could not help but keep close watch over his debtor's affairs; the
term that came into common use to describe the assignee's unremitting supervision of
the assignor's enterprise was "policing." All the receivables passed through his hands.
The amount of the loan was adjusted at frequent intervals. Furthermore, the loan
agreement always gave the assignee the right to examine the assignor's books. In a
large operation the assignee might put his own man in the assignor's office to maintain
a continuous supervision; even if he did not do that, any suspicious fluctuation in the
amount of receivables assigned would be the occasion for the assignee's men to make a
check of the books.
... We may conclude that the Benedict rule produced some exceedingly good results in
forcing non-notification receivables financing into a desirable pattern.
GRANT GILMORE, 1SECURITY INTERESTS IN PERSONAL PROPERTY 260-61 (1965).
31 There is no scope-limiting statutory definition of the term "sccuritization" in the Delaware
ABS statute; there is only a provision which states that "[i]t is intended by the General Assembly
that the term 'securitization transaction' shall be construed broadly." DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, §
2702A (2003); see also supra note 29 (discussing other ABS statutes, some of which contain
restrictive definitions).
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intention of the parties, 3 2 most look to the intention of the parties as
manifested in the deal itself and find a true sale only if a court
concludes that the risks and benefits of ownership have been transferred
to the purchaser. 33 By contrast, under the Delaware ABS Statute, a
"sale" pursuant to a "securitization transaction" is treated as a "true
sale," regardless of its economic attributes, if the documents call it a
34
",sale.,

A.

True Sale and Securitization Explained

The Delaware ABS Statute is intended to abolish the "intended as
security" or true sale doctrine. Under that doctrine, the law of
contracts 35 and property law 36 treat transactions denominated "sales" by
32 See, e.g., In re Kassuba, 562 F.2d 511, 514 (7th Cir. 1977) ("[T]he parties by contract may
create a set of mutual economic benefits that is similar to a mortgage without conferring on each
other the rights and liabilities of judicial foreclosure, if that is what they actually intend."); In re
OMNE Partners II, 67 B.R 793, 795 (Bankr. D. N.H. 1986) ("In the context of sale-leaseback
realty transactions, however, this power should be exercised only upon a showing of 'clear and
convincing evidence' by the debtor that the transaction should be deemed a disguised financing
transaction.") (citing Fox v. Peck Iron and Metal Co., 25 B.R. 674, 688 (Bankr. S.D. Cal. 1982));
Cohen v. Army Moral Support Fund (In re Bevill, Bressler & Schulman Asset Mgmt. Corp.), 67
B.R. 557, 598 (Bankr. D. N.J. 1986) ("There is an ever present need for certainty and
predictability in commercial transactions of any sort. To ignore the voluntary decision of
contracting parties to structure their transactions in a particular manner, and to disregard widely
recognized and accepted industry practices would only foster confusion within the repurchase
market.").
33 See, e.g., Major's Furniture Mart, Inc. v. Castle Credit Corp., 602 F.2d 538, 546 (3d Cir.
1979) ("[O]n this record none of the risks present in a true sale is present here. Nor has the
custom of the parties or their relationship, as found by the district court, given rise to more than a
debtor/creditor relationship ... bringing the transaction within the ambit of 12A P.S. § 9-502.");
see also Peter V. Pantaleo et al., Rethinking the Role of Recourse in the Sale of FinancialAssets,
52 BUS. LAW. 159 (1996) (arguing that warranties relating to collection risk should not endanger
true sale treatment, but that sales accompanied by warranties relating to rate of return should be
treated as loans).
34 See supra text accompanying note 29.
35 See RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONTRACTS § 526 (1932), which provides:
Where the intent of a party to a bargain is to make a loan of money or an extension of
the maturity of a pecuniary debt for a greater profit than is allowed by law, the
agreement is illegal though the transaction is put in whole or in part in the form of a
sale, a contract to sell or other contract.
Id; see also Butts v. Samuel, 174 N.Y.S.2d 325 (N.Y. App. Div. 1958); A. M. Swarthout,
Annotation, Advance in Pricefor Credit Sale as Compared with Cash Sale as Usury, 14 A.L.R.3d
1065 (2004) (collecting cases).
36 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERY: MORTGAGES § 3.2(a) (1997) ("Parol evidence is
admissible to establish that a deed purporting to be an absolute conveyance of real estate was
intended to serve as security for an obligation, and should therefore be deemed a mortgage."); see
also id.§3.3(a):
Parol evidence is admissible to establish that a deed purporting to be an absolute
conveyance of real estate accompanied by a written agreement conferring on the
grantor a right to purchase the real estate, was intended to serve as a security for an
obligation, and should therefore be deemed a mortgage.
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the parties as "loans" if the buyer has not assumed the risks or
purchased the benefits of ownership, but has instead advanced funds in
return for a guaranteed rate of interest. Therefore, if the transaction is
"in substance" a loan, it will be treated as such. In short, the doctrine of
true sale governs the line between sales law and the law of mortgages or
secured credit. This recharacterization doctrine has a number of
important consequences:
* First, lenders are not able to evade a state's mandated
7
foreclosure procedures, including Part 6 of Article 9,3
which protect a borrower's right to redeem collateral (or
"equity of redemption") 38 from overreaching creditors who
may seek to extract a windfall upon a minimal default, or
39
by engaging in a collusive sale.
* Second, lenders are not able to evade a state's mandated
notice provisions for secured loans, 40 such as Article 9's
perfection rules.
* Third, property held by a debtor subject to a security
41
interest is still property of the debtor's bankruptcy estate,
and, while the creditor is entitled to "adequate protection,"
42
foreclosure may be delayed by the automatic stay.
The effect of the Delaware ABS Statute is to allow certain
creditors to opt-out of regulation by the Bankruptcy Code, and, more
importantly for the purposes of this Article, to opt-out of the regulatory
components of Article 943 and the law of mortgages by structuring their
Id.

37 See Revised U.C.C. § 9-60 1(g) ("Except as otherwise provided in Section 9-607(c), this
part imposes no duties upon a secured party that is a consignor or is a buyer of accounts, chattel
paper, payment intangibles, or promissory notes."). Comment 9 makes clear that buyers of
accounts, chattel paper, payment intangibles and promissory notes have no duties to the seller, or
the seller's collateral with regard to the collateral's disposition. Id. § 9-601 cmt. 9 ("Although
denominated 'secured parties,' these buyers own the entire interest in the property sold and so
may enforce their rights without regard to the seller ('debtor') or the seller's creditors.").
38 Id. § 9-623.
39 Id. §§ 9-625, 9-626.
40 Where "accounts" and "chattel paper" are involved, filing is required to perfect a sale, as
well as a property interest which secures a debt obligation, so notice is assured either way, id. § 9310, but where "promissory notes," 'payment intangibles,' "general intangibles," and "goods"
are involved, no filing is required to perfect a sale. Id. §§ 9-309(3)-(4), 9-318 ("promissory
notes" and "payment intangibles"), 2-403 (goods).
41 11 U.S.C. § 54 1(a) (2000). David Carlson has argued that, for a number of reasons, even
property subject to a true sale securitization may be "property of the estate." David Gray Carlson,
The Rotten Foundations of Securitization,39 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1055 (1998)
42 11 U.S.C. §§ 361, 362 (2000).
43 Where non-financial assets are involved, the opt-out of Article 9's remedies provisions
may be slightly more difficult to accomplish than with financial assets. U.C.C. § 9-301 bifurcates
the choice of law decision for tangible assets. See supra note 20. The law of the jurisdiction
where the debtor is located governs perfection, while the law of the jurisdiction where the
collateral is located governs the effect of perfection. Thus while the Delaware ABS statute may
reach intangible assets wherever located, it may only reach tangible assets in Delaware.
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deals as "securitizations." '44
The Delaware ABS Statute and its siblings 45 (collectively, the

"ABS Statutes") appear to be, as their titles and effect indicate, a
product of lobbying by the "securitization" or "structured finance"
industry. 46 Securitization is a financing device whereby business
entities raise money by selling assets, instead of borrowing against
them. 47 The basic structure of a securitization is a creative twist on a
secured loan. Instead of entering into a secured financing, where assets
are used as collateral for a loan, a company that wishes to raise money
(the "Originator") sells assets to a separately organized entity-a special
purpose vehicle ("SPV")--that exists solely for the purpose of buying
assets from the Originator 48 and issuing securities backed by those
assets ("Asset Backed Securities" or "ABS"). The assets conveyed can
44 Paradoxically, while the principle focus of the Delaware ABS statute appears to be to
exclude securitized assets from the Bankruptcy estate, for reasons discussed below this effort may
or may not work. Recent and not-so-recent Supreme Court precedent suggests that the definition
of "property of the estate" for bankruptcy purposes is a question of federal, rather than state law.
See II U.S.C. § 54 1(a) (2000); United States v. Whiting Pools, 462 U.S. 198, 203 (1983) ("The
reorganization effort would have small chance of success, however, if property essential to
running the business were excluded from the estate."); cf United States v. Craft, 535 U.S. 274,
278 (2002) ("Whether the interests of respondent's husband in the property he held as a tenant by
the entirety constitutes 'property and rights to property' for the purposes of the federal tax lien
statute is ultimately a question of federal law.") (citation omitted). As such, the principal effect
of this law may simply be to provide an opt-out from Article 9's remedial provisions (such as the
requirement of a commercially reasonable sale of the collateral) for secured loans, and, perhaps
from the requirements of perfection. In at least some cases, characterization as a "sale" will
relieve the securitization vehicle (or special purpose vehicle) from the need to disclose its interest
in property by filing. For example, Revised U.C.C. § 9-318(b), which is discussed at length by
Professor White, see James, J.White, Chuck and Steve's Peccadillo, 25 CARDOZO L. REV. 1743
(2004), requires filing to perfect a sale of "account[s]," and "chattel paper," but not promissory
notes or payment intangibles. By contrast, to perfect a "security interest" in "payment
intangibles," filing would be required, Revised U.C.C. § 9-310, and to perfect a security interest
in "promissory notes" filing or possession (to the extent the promissory notes were "instruments")
would be required. Id. § 9-313.
45 See supra note 29.
46 See infra text accompanying notes 94-96.
47 The Comptroller of the Currency Comptroller's Handbook describes a securitization as:
the structured process whereby interests in loans and other receivables are packaged,
underwritten, and sold in the form of "asset backed" securities. From the perspective
of the credit originators, this market enables them to transfer some of the risks of
ownership to parties more willing or able to manage them. By doing so, originators
can access the funding markets at debt ratings higher than their overall corporate
ratings, which generally gives them access to broader funding sources at more
favorable rates. By removing the assets and supporting debt from their balance sheets
they are able to save some of the costs of on-balance-sheet financing and manage
potential asset-liability mismatches and credit concentrations.
COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, ADM'R OF NAT'L BANKS, ASSET SECURITIZATION:
COMPTROLLER'S HANDBOOK 2 (1997), available at http://www.occ.treas.gov/handbook/
assetsec.pdf.
48 Sometimes the deal is structured with two SPVs. In such a deal, the sale to the first SPV is
structured as a true sale for bankruptcy purposes, while the second sale is structured as a true sale
for accounting purposes. Pantalco et al., supra note 33, at 162 n.8.
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take many forms. They may be mortgage loans receivables, credit card
receivables, lease receivables, or the accounts receivable of the
Originator (collectively, the "Assets"). In most securitizations the
assets can be loosely characterized as "financial assets." However, the
ABS Statutes, with the exception of those enacted in Louisiana and
49
North Carolina, are not, by their terms, limited to such assets.
Conceptually, a securitization could include just about anything.50 The
principal attraction of securitization derives from the fact that the
Originator can raise money more economically by selling the Assets
than it can by borrowing against them. According to one commentator,
securitized lending offers a 150 basis point spread over conventional
secured lending.5 1 And, by all accounts, securitization is booming.
More than $2 trillion of home mortgages alone "[h]ave been bundled
into securities and investors from around the world own these
5' 2
securitized mortgages.
B.

The Value of Securitization:Liquidity and Risk Pooling

This cost advantage of securitization derives, in part, from two
distinct value creating characteristics. First, securitization enhances the
liquidity of asset backed debt, making it available in smaller
denominations to non-specialized investors. Second, it allows smaller
investors to enjoy the benefits of risk pooling. 53 For an example of both
effects, imagine an individual investor with $100,000 to invest. This
investor might not want to invest all her money in one residential real
estate mortgage for two related reasons. First, she might want to
diversify her investments into stocks, residential real estate lending, and
other investments. Second, she is only in a position to invest in small
mortgages of $100,000 or less. However, she might be very interested
in investing $10,000 into a mortgage backed security that represented a
share in a mortgage pool containing thousands of real estate mortgages
of varying sizes and risk attributes. By investing in Asset Backed
Securities, she can both invest a small amount, and spread the risk of
49 See supra note 29.

50 See, e.g., In re LTV Steel Co., 274 B.R. 278, 280 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 2001) ("In 1998,
Debtor entered into another ABS financing arrangement .... Debtor created LTV Steel Products,
LLC ('Steel Products'), another wholly-owned subsidiary. Debtor entered into an agreement with
Steel Products which purports to sell all of Debtor's . . . inventory to Steel Products on a
continuing basis.") (emphasis added).
51 Lowell Bryan, The Risks, Potential and Promise of Securitization, in A PRIMER ON

SECURITIZATION 171-73 (Leon T. Kendall & Michael J. Fishman eds., 1996).
52 Christopher Farrell, Why Things Aren't a Whole Lot Worse, BUS. WK. ONLINE, June 15,
2001, at http://www.businessweek.com/bwdaily/dnflash/jun2001/nf20010615_907.htm.
53 See Steven L. Schwarcz, The Alchemy of Asset Securitization, 1 STAN. J.L. Bus. & FIN.

133, 134 (1994).
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default across a large number of mortgages. Thus, securitization
provides the investor with the benefits of both diversification and risk
spreading, while it provides to the borrower the benefits of liquidity and
risk pooling.
C.

The Costs of Securitization:Risk Alteration and Transparency

The benefits of liquidity and risk pooling do not come without
costs, and these costs are often overlooked. Because securitizations are
structured as sales rather than loans, the Assets, once sold, are placed
beyond the reach of the creditors of the Originator,5 4 and the Originator
may be deprived of any protections of its "equity" in the Assets
provided by Article 9 or state mortgage law. 5 This can shift risk from
investors in the assets held by the SPV to the creditors of the
Originator. 56 This risk alteration is similar in nature and effect to the
risk alteration caused by secured credit. However, the effect is
enhanced, because securitization is thought to place the Assets
conveyed to the SPV beyond the reach of sections 541, 362 and 363 of
the Bankruptcy Code. The "sold" assets are not "property of the
estate," so the creditor/purchaser's collection efforts will not be barred
by the "automatic stay" imposed on creditors when the Originator files
for bankruptcy, or delayed by the Originator/Debtor's power to "use"
7
cash collateral.
This risk alteration effect of securitization is further compounded
by what might be called "transparency costs."
One source of
transparency costs results from the peculiarities of the rules for off-

54 There is some division of opinion as to how effective this insulation is. Compare Carlson,
supra note 41, with Thomas E. Plank, The OuterBoundaries of the Bankruptcy Estate, 47 EMORY
L.J. 1193 (1998), and Paul M. Shupack, Making Revised Article 9 Safe for Securitizations:A
BriefHistory, 73 AM. BANKR. L.J. 167 (1999).
55 Where goods or real property are involved, Delaware incorporation will not be sufficient.
See supra note 20. A true sale statute likely only governs real estate in the jurisdiction where it is
enacted.
56 See Lynn M. LoPucki, The Irrefutable Logic of Judgment Proofing:A Reply to Professor
Schwarez, 52 STAN. L. REV. 55, 64-66 (1999) (discussing structured finance as judgment
proofing device); Steven L. Schwarcz, Rethinking a Corporation'sObligations to Creditors, 17
CARDOZO L. REV. 647, 649 (1996) ("in leveraged finance transactions, the increase in a
corporation's debt burden often works to the detriment of existing creditors ....
The same
conflict can arise in structured finance and securitization transactions."). Schwarcz, however,
unlike LoPucki, seems to think that the benefits outweigh the costs. See Steven L. Schwarcz,
Rethinking Freedom of Contract.-A Bankruptcy Paradigm,77 TEX. L. REV. 515 (1999); Steven
L. Schwarcz, The InherentIrrationalityof Judgment Proofing,52 STAN. L. REV. 1 (1999); Steven
L. Schwarcz, Judgment Proofing: A Rejoinder, 52 STAN. L. REV. 77 (1999). For my views, see
Edward J. Janger, Muddy Rules for Securitizations, 7 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 301 (2002);
Janger Letter, supra note 18.
57 Again, compare Carlson, supra note 41, with Plank, supra note 54.
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balance sheet accounting for securitized assets.5 8 These rules (while
currently in flux) 59 have historically allowed the Originator of an ABS

transaction to retain substantial dominion over the assets and substantial
ownership of the SPV, and allowed the SPV to retain significant
recourse against the Originator, while nonetheless leaving both the
value and the risk associated with securitized assets off the Originator's
balance sheet. 60 As the recent Enron debacle makes clear, a sale of
Assets to an SPV can be used to move debt off the Originator's balance
sheet, to accelerate (or even manufacture) earnings, or to hide assets, as
61
the parties to the transaction desire.
However, accounting rules are not the only source of transparency
costs that result from securitization. Some of these costs inhere in the
interaction between sales law and the law of secured credit, and are
compounded by the ABS Statutes. As a general rule, to perfect a
security interest, notice must be given to creditors through a filing in the
UCC system or by taking possession. 62 For sales, as a general rule, no
such notice is required. 63 Exceptions exist. For example, sales of
"accounts" and "chattel paper" must be filed in the Article 9 system to
be effective against third parties, 64 and real estate sales must be recorded
in the land records. 65 Other sales, however, even those of assets
otherwise subject to Article 9,66 are not subject to this requirement.
Thus, even under current law, securitization has some transparency
costs.
An example of this effect leaps from the pages of Jim White's
Article. 67 When one compares subsection (a) of revised sections 9-318

58 See FIN. ACCOUNTING STANDARDS BD., ACCOUNTING FOR TRANSFERS AND SERVICING
OF FINANCIAL ASSETS AND EXTINGUISHMENTS OF LIABILITIES - A REPLACEMENT OF FASB
STATEMENT NO. 125, available at http://www.fasb.org/st (issued Sept. 2000).

59 For the current state of the Financial Accounting Standards Board's efforts to amend the
accounting rules regarding securitizations, see Fin. Accounting Standards Bd., Project Updates:
Qualifying
Special-Purpose
Entities and
Isolation
of Transferred
Assets,
at
http://www.fasb.org/project/qualifyingspe.shtml (last updated Jan. 30, 2004).

60 These transparency costs are discussed in Janger, Muddy Rules for Securitizations, supra
note 56, and became a substantial issue in the debate over Section 912 to the Bankruptcy Reform

Act of 2001. Indeed, these costs led a large number of securities professors to object to Section
912 as well.
61 Second Interim Report of Neal Batson, Court-Appointed Examiner, In re Enron Corp., No.
01-16034 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. filed Dec. 2, 2001); see also Special Investigative Committee of the

Board of Directors of Enron, Report of Investigation (Feb. 1, 2002) [hereinafter Powers Report],
available at http://news.findlaw.com/hdocs/docs/enron/sicreport/index.html (last visited April 21,

2004).
62 Revised U.C.C. § 9-310 (2001).
63 Id. § 2-403.
64 Id. § 9-310.
65 See, e.g., N.Y. REAL PROP. LAW § 291 (McKinney 1989 & Supp. 2004).
66 Revised U.C.C. § 9-309.
67 White, supra note 44.
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with subsection (b),68 one notes an odd anomaly. According to 9318(a), when "accounts," "chattel paper," "promissory notes," and
"payment intangibles" are sold, the seller retains no property interest.
However, 9-318(b) requires perfection by filing only for "accounts" and
"chattel paper." Sections 9-309(3) and (4) confirm this reading: sales of
"payment intangibles" and "promissory notes" are perfected without
filing. 69 This is true, even though filing (and/or possession in the case
of "promissory notes" that are "instruments") is (are) required to perfect
a security interest in "promissory notes" and "payment intangibles" that
secures an obligation. 70 Thus, for these assets, creditors and other
potential purchasers would be given notice of the lesser interest (a lien),
but not the greater interest (a sale).
This anomaly predates Article 9's recent expansion to cover sales
of "payment intangibles" and "promissory notes," 71 and its costs may be
tolerable, given that under current law it applies only to "true sates."
However, the ABS Statutes, by giving effect to all conveyances that are
denominated sales in "securitization" transactions, may free the parties
of the need to disclose even "non-true sale" securitizations. 72 In short,
the ABS Statutes don't just undercut the Bankruptcy Code, they
undercut the Article 9 filing requirement. Indeed, a not particularly
aggressive reading of the Delaware ABS Statute 73 suggests that it might
go even further, and override the Article 9 filing requirement altogether
74
for all sales pursuant to securitization transactions.
When considering these risk alteration and transparency costs, it is
important to recognize that the securitization form is not limited to sales
of financial assets. While these transactions often take the form of a
commercial bank securitizing its mortgage receivables, or a merchant
bank securitizing its credit card receivables, the structure encompasses,
and many of the ABS Statutes reach, a wider variety of transactions.
Conceptually, an SPV can hold many types of assets, financial or
otherwise. Nothing in the the Delaware ABS Statute, for example,
stops an Originator from using the SPV as a form of field warehouse,
where operations are conducted by one entity, but all of the assets are
75
held by another.
68 Revised U.C.C. § 9-318(a)-(b).
69 Id.§ 9-309(3)-(4).
70 Id. § 9-310.
71 Former Article 9 only covered sales of "accounts" and "chattel paper." U.C.C. § 9-102
(1998).
72 See supra note 29.
73 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 2703A(a)(1) (2003); see also supra note 29 and accompanying
text.
74 I am not advancing this horrible as a conclusion, but merely as a possibility. The
"notwithstanding" and "no-rights" language in the Delaware ABS Statute, see supra note 29 and
accompanying text, might be read by a court as a trump.
75 Indeed, while not directly at issue in the opinion, the securitization described in the LTV
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Similarly, while the driving financial motivation for a
securitization transaction might be the efficiency associated with
liquidity enhancement and/or risk pooling, the motivation might instead
be to capture the benefits of secrecy (because no Article 9 filing is
required for sales of assets other than "accounts" and "chattel paper").
Worse yet, the transaction might be driven by a desire to use off-balance
sheet accounting to accelerate earnings through the use of "mark to
market" accounting, move assets off the balance sheet, move debt off
the balance sheet, or conceal risk. And, lest these risks be viewed as
trivial, in Enron, the concealment of business risks in off-balance sheet
special purpose entities caused a publicly traded company to fool its
76
auditors and misstate shareholder equity by billions of dollars.
Thus, the source of the apparent 150 basis point advantage enjoyed
by securitization over secured debt 77 is generated in part by valuecreating, efficiency-enhancing attributes of securitization transactions,
and in part by the externalities created by (1) shifting risk of default to
non-adjusting and non-consensual creditors of the Originator, (2)
concealing liens, and (3) distorting the balance sheet of the Originator
by taking opportunistic advantage of accounting rules to call something
a sale which is really a loan. Originators of securitization transactions
may therefore choose to use this method of capital formation for two
distinct sets of reasons, one efficiency enhancing, and the other rooted
in moral hazard.
D. InstitutionalMechanismsfor ControllingRisk Alteration and
Transparency Costs: The Role of True Sale
There are a number of institutional mechanisms that could, if they
worked properly, limit the pernicious effects of securitization, even in
the absence of the doctrine of "true sale." First, corporate officers and
directors are bound by their fiduciary duties to shareholders not to
knowingly distort the balance sheet of the company, 78 and, to the extent
that the debtor is in the zone of insolvency, not to use financial
case involved both "accounts" and "inventory." In re LTV Steel Co., 274 B.R. 278, 280 (Bankr.
N.D. Ohio 2001). Douglas Baird, in his contribution to this symposium describes a Volvo plant
in South America, where each of the functions is carried out by a different subcontractor; Volvo
is merely the name on the front door. Douglas G. Baird, Secured Lending and Its Uncertain
Future, 25 CARDOZO L. REv. 1789 (2004).
76 See Second Interim Report of Neal Batson, Court-Appointed Examiner, In re Enron Corp.,
No. 01-16034 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. filed Dec. 2, 2001); See also Powers Report, supra note 61, at 2.
77 See supra note 51 and accompanying text.
78 See, e.g., Malone v. Brincat, 722 A.2d 5, 9 (Del. 1998) ("[D]irectors who knowingly
disseminate false information that results in corporate injury or damage to an individual
stockholder violate their fiduciary duty, and may be held accountable in a manner appropriate to
the circumstances.").
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structures to harm creditors. 79 Second, a "Final Four" 80 accounting firm
could rigorously police the debtor's balance sheet, and ensure that
creative structures are not being used to distort the financial picture of
the company that is presented to investors. However, the recent spate of
corporate accounting scandals makes it very difficult to list these
protections with a straight face. Corporate officers face inevitable
8
conflicts of interest, and the accountants appear to as well. '
This is where the doctrine of true sale fits into the legal
architecture; its effects are both substantive, in that it regulates
transactions themselves, and procedural or governance based, in that it
allocates risk to the professionals who implement securitizations. The
doctrine of true sale causes difficulties for securitization, because the
sine qua non of the form is said to be asset isolation-the purchasers of
asset backed securities need only look at the financial attributes of the
82
securitized assets, not at the financial characteristics of the Originator.
But, in order to get the benefit of asset isolation, the assets must be truly
isolated. In other words, the seller must relinquish, and the buyer must
bear the benefits and risks of ownership.
The difficulty lies in the fact that many securitization transactions
live very close to the line between sales and loans. The Originator may
wish to retain an equity interest in the SPV, thus retaining a piece of the
upside, if the value of the financial assets conveyed exceeds the
"purchase" price. On the flip side, the Originator may warrant, or
guaranty to the SPV that certain assets will yield certain amounts, and
promise to make up the difference if they do not. Thus the Originator
also retains a piece of the downside risk associated with owning the
asset.83 The doctrine of true sale endangers transactions that tread too
close to this divide.
The muddy line between a true sale and a "sale intended as
security" has important institutional and practical consequences for
securitizations. Because favorable bankruptcy treatment requires the
79 See, e.g., In re Buckhead Am. Corp., 178 B.R. 956, 968 (Bankr. D. Del. 1994); Odyssey
Partners, L.P. v. Fleming Cos., 735 A.2d 386, 417-18 (Del. Ch. 1999); Credit Lyonnais Bank
Nederland, N.V. v. Pathe Communications Corp., No. 12150, mem. op. at 84 & n.55 (Del. Ch.
Dec. 30, 1991).
80 First it was the "Big Eight," then the "Big Six," then the "Big Five," and now, with the
demise of Arthur Andersen, the "Final Four."
81 See generally ENRON: CORPORATE FIASCOS AND LEGAL IMPLICATIONS (Nancy Rapoport

& Jeff van Niel eds., 2004). As noted above, see supra note 59, the Enron scandal has led the
Financial Accounting Standards Board to modify its rules for off-balance sheet accounting.
However, the new rules are still a work in progress, and they remain to be tested.
82 See, e.g., Mark C. Ellenberg, "StructuredFinance" Technique an Asset in Bankruptcy,
WASH. BUS. J., Sept. 7, 2001 ("In simple terms, structured finance isolates assets from the
insolvency
risk
associated
with
an
operating
company"),
available at
http://washington.bizjoumals.com/washington/stories/2001/09/10/focus7.html (Sept. 7, 2001).
83 See Pantaleo et al., supra note 33, at 162-63 (distinguishing between "warranties of
collectibility" and "economic recourse").
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transaction to be characterized as a "true sale," rating agencies, such as
Moody's or Standard and Poor's routinely insist on assurance that the
SPV, and the assets it holds, are "bankruptcy remote." They generally
require the Originator to obtain an opinion of counsel stating (1) that the
sale of assets by the Originator to the SPV is a "true sale" to a "separate
84
entity;" and (2) that the sale is not subject to substantive consolidation.
In short, the attorneys must concern themselves with the questions of
"risk alteration" and "transparency" by predicting how a judge might
view the transaction ex post.
It is possible to criticize these opinion letters. They tend to be very
long, highly qualified, and quite expensive. This is not, in and of itself,
a reason to abandon the doctrine of "true sale." First, even if these
opinions are of limited value, they operate as a tax on securitizations
that limits the effect to which risk alteration and transparency costs will
justify the transaction. 85 In addition, and more importantly, the doctrine
of true sale provides an opportunity for judicial examination of the
substance of the transaction. The fear of a judicial determination that a
transaction is not a true sale will also deter inefficient transactions at the
margin.
The doctrine of true sale thus plays a crucial role in limiting
(though not entirely eliminating) risk alteration and transparency costs
associated with securitization. 86 Its abolition, all else being equal, is
likely to increase the number of inefficient transactions.
II.

THE CAMPAIGN TO ABOLISH THE DOCTRINE OF TRUE SALE

The securitization industry has grown over the last decade and a
half from almost non-existent, to one of the dominant institutions for
capital formation, and it has done so under current law. So why is there
suddenly such a need for a statutory safe harbor? The problem is that
the securitization industry grew by promising the benefits of liquidity,
risk pooling and asset isolation without ever truly testing the legal basis
or contours of the third promise. The campaign to abolish true sale
began when courts and commentators had the bad manners to call
84 Edwin E. Smith, Recent Developments in the Characterization in Bankruptcy of Prepetition
Transfers of Rights to Payment: True Sales or Disguised Loans?-Proposal for a Uniform State
Law on What Constitutes a True Sale of a Right to Payment, Address Before the Business
Transactions Subcommittee, Business Bankruptcy Committee, of the Business Law Section of the
American Bar Association 7 (Oct. 3, 2002).
85 Gillian K. Hadfield, Judicial Competence and the Interpretationof Incomplete Contracts,
23 J. LEGAL STUD. 159 (1994); Janger, Crystals and Mud, supra note 10, at 603-06; Eric A.
Posner, A Theory of ContractLaw Under Conditions of Radical Judicial Error, 94 NW. U. L.
REV. 749, 753 (2000).
86 See Janger, Muddy Rulesfor Securitization,supra note 56, at 313-16.
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attention to this fact. The movement arose in the wake of the Tenth
Circuit's poorly reasoned decision in Octagon Gas v. Rimmer, 87 and
gathered steam after David Carlson wrote an article making a more
coherent argument for the proposition that securitized assets remain
property of the Originator's bankruptcy estate. 88 The clamor for
abolition of true sale became deafening after the LTV case, 89 in which a
bankruptcy court in the Northern District of Ohio allowed the debtor to
use securitized assets as cash collateral during the early part of a
Chapter 11 case. Each of these events struck fear into the hearts of the
bond lawyers who had given "bankruptcy remoteness" opinions, and
rating agencies who had assumed, when they rated asset backed
securities, that they did not need to consider the solvency of the
Originator. Having backed themselves into a comer, they have looked
to state and federal legislators for a way out.
The first attempt was at the federal level, by inserting a safe harbor
into the various proposed Bankruptcy Reform Acts from 1999 through
early 2002.90 That proposed provision applied only to securitizations
where at least one tranche of securities issued by the SPV would receive
an "investment grade" rating from a nationally recognized statistical
rating organization ("NRSRO"). 9 1 For those deals, however, the
provision would have abolished the true sale doctrine, and eliminated
any state law avoidance actions based on fraudulent conveyance or
other causes of action. 92 That provision was removed from the bill
when a number of law professors, myself included, pointed out that the
provision contained a number of technical glitches, and more
importantly, that it might increase transparency costs, by facilitating the
opportunistic use of off-balance sheet accounting as occurred at
93
Enron.
By contrast to their failure to enact a safe harbor at the federal
level, proponents of asset backed securitization have had more success
at the state level and in the Uniform Law process. Section 9-31894 is an
87 995 F.2d 948 (10th Cir. 1993).
88 Carlson, supra note 41.
89 In re LTV Steel Co., 274 B.R. 278 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 2001).
90 This provision can be found in the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1999, S. 625, 106th Cong. §
903 (1st Sess. 1999), and H.R. 833, 106th Cong. § 1012 (1st Sess. 1999). H.R. 833 was passed
by the House on May 5, 1999, and adopted as a substitute for S.625 by the Senate on February 2,
2000. That Bill was pocket vetoed by President Clinton on Dec. 19, 2000. The provision then
reappeared in the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2001, S. 220,
107th Cong. § 912 (1st Sess. 2001), H.R. 333, 107th Cong. § 912 (1st Sess. 2001), but was
removed in early 2002 in response to academic criticism. See supra note 18.
91 274 B.R. 278. For a description of NRSROs, see Steven L. Schwarcz, Private Orderingof
Public Markets: The Rating Agency Paradox,2002 U. ILL. L. REV. 1.

92 Though fraudulent, conveyance avoidance would have remained available for transactions
within one year of the bankruptcy under 11 U.S.C. § 548 (2000).
93 See supra note 18.
94 See supra notes 68-70 and accompanying text; see also White, supra note 44.
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example of the securitization industry's effect on the Article 9 drafting
process, and the ABS Statutes seek to accomplish precisely what the
95
proposed bankruptcy safe-harbor would have accomplished, and more.
The Delaware ABS Statute, described above, is not limited in effect to
"rated deals;" neither are its siblings in South Dakota, Alabama, Texas,
Louisiana, and Ohio. 96 These statutes are spreading like kudzu, and I do
not entirely understand why the partisans of secured credit appear to be
standing idly by.
III.

THE DEATH OF SECURED LENDING

This passivity may be a mistake. The ABS Statutes 97 pose a threat
to secured lending as well as to bankruptcy. With the ABS Statutes in
place, when would a debtor ever choose to borrow if it could afford to
securitize? Assuming that the ABS Statutes accomplish what they
purport to, the answer would appear to be almost never. As noted
above, all of these ABS Statutes provide companies in need of financing
with the ability to opt out of Article 9's internal regulatory structure,
and seek to free securitized assets from the burdens often placed on
them by the Bankruptcy Code. In particular, ABS investors are freed
from the burden of the bankruptcy trustee's power to "use" property of
the estate, including, on court approval, "cash collateral." 98 This
advantage comes regardless of whether the transaction provides either
the risk pooling or liquidity enhancing benefits that are the raison d'etre
for securitization.
Because these statutes are not limited in effect to securitizations
that provide risk pooling and liquidity benefits, they are available as a
substitute for virtually any type of secured loan. Not only that, they are
a substitute that comes free of certain "regulatory" costs. Why lend
money when you can buy assets, retain recourse against the debtor,
streamline the foreclosure process, and avoid the bankruptcy estate?
Why borrow money when you can sell assets, and retain the upside, not
list the debt on your balance sheet, get a better rate of interest, and more
effectively externalize risk to non-consensual and non-adjusting
creditors?
Secured lending runs the risk of becoming the poor cousin of
securitization, not because securitization offers greater efficiency, but
because it facilitates regulatory evasions and creates economic
95 See supra note 29.
96 See supra note 29. North Carolina has enacted a statute that tracks the proposed federal
provision in this regard. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 53-426 (2004).
97 See supra note 29 and accompanying text.

98 11 U.S.C. § 363 (2000).
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distortions. These distortions alter risk, undercut transparency, and as a
side effect, favor consolidation among both borrowers and lenders.
First, while securitizations may provide an interest rate advantage, they
are expensive to construct, and therefore are only economic for
transactions of significant size. Securitization thus favors larger
enterprises over smaller ones. Second, securitization favors large
financial supermarkets over traditional commercial banks. Prior to the
enactment of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act in 1999 ("GLB"),99 the
Glass-Steagall Act enforced a separation between the businesses of
commercial banks and thrifts both of which engage in secured lending,
and that of investment banks, which could underwrite securities. GLB
eliminated the wall of separation.' 0 0 Therefore, the same financial
institutions can now loan money and underwrite securitizations.
Nonetheless, not all financial institutions embrace both the functions of
commercial and investment banking. Favoring securitization over
lending favors consolidated financial supermarkets over either
independent investment banks or independent banks. Indeed, in a world
where ABS Statutes were the norm, there might be only a very few
debtors who would choose to raise money by actually borrowing itthose who couldn't afford to securitize, and secured loans would only
be offered by banks that lacked the wherewithal to structure
securitizations.
IV.

THE ABOLITION OF TRUE SALE AND THE "RACE TO THE BoTroM"

Having raised concerns about the abolition of the true sale
doctrine, one might be tempted to respond that this is just an example of
states experimenting with their own property law. Brandeis described
states as the laboratories of democracy. 10 1 Is there any reason not to let
99 Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999 (also known as the Financial Services Modernization
Act), Pub. L. No. 106-102, 113 Stat. 1338 (1999) (codified in scattered sections of 12 and 15
U.S.C.).
100 The Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act repeals sections of the Banking Act of 1933 (also known as
the Glass-Steagall Act). 12 U.S.C. §§ 378, 1843 (2000). The critical sections of the GlassSteagall Act, sections 20 and 32, restricted banks and security firms from affiliating with each
other. See Neal R. Pandozzi, Beware of Banks Bearing Gifts: Grarnm-Leach-Bliley and the
Constitutionality of Federal Financial Privacy Legislation, 55 U. MIAMI L. REV. 163, 171
(2001). Section 4 of the Bank Holding Company Act of 1956, ch. 240, § 4, 70 Stat. 135 (1956)
(current version at 12 U.S.C. § 1843 (2000)), had generally prevented a bank from controlling a
non-bank company without a finding by the Federal Reserve Board of a close relation of the
activities of the non-bank company to banking. GLB eliminated this restriction as well. See the
Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999, Pub. L. No. 106-102, §§ 102(a), 103(a), (c)(2), 107(a), (b),
(d)-(f), 113 Stat. 1341-1342, 1351, 1359-1361 (1999); see also Pandozzi, supra,at 171.
101 See New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)
("There must be power in the States and the Nation to remould, through experimentation, our
economic practices and institutions to meet changing social and economic needs.").
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Delaware, South Dakota, Alabama, Texas, Ohio, and North Carolina' 02
engage in local experimentation? The answer is "yes," and the reason
lies in the dynamics of federalism.
One revolutionary and widely applauded change accomplished by
Revised Article 9 was to rewrite the choice-of-law rules for secured
transactions. In one fell swoop, however, the Article 9 drafting
committee may have inadvertently turned commercial law into a lever
in the competition of states for incorporation. Under former Article 9,
the law of the jurisdiction where the collateral was located governed
tangible collateral, and the law of the jurisdiction where the debtor was
located governed intangible collateral and mobile goods. 103 Revised
Article 9 simplified matters considerably. The law of the jurisdiction
where the debtor is located now governs perfection for all types of
collateral and the effect of perfection for intangible collateral and
mobile goods. Furthermore, for corporate debtors, the debtor's location
is deemed to be its state of incorporation. 0 4 While it is not easy for a
corporation to move its corporate headquarters and tangible assets to
take advantage of favorable law in a particular jurisdiction, it is not
particularly difficult to reincorporate. As I speculated in an earlier
article, 0 5 state of incorporation filing may make it possible for
Delaware, by non-uniform enactment, to favor Delaware incorporators
over non-Delaware incorporators by enacting favorable rules regarding
perfection, and, to the extent that choice of law rules allow, with regard
to substantive treatment as well. This concern is validated by the ABS
06
statutes. 1
Simply saying that a law is chosen to engage in interstate
regulatory competition does not, by itself, compel the conclusion that
the competition is inefficient. State competition can lead to a race to the
top (efficiency) or a race to the bottom (inefficiency). Again, as I have
argued elsewhere, 07 it is possible to predict whether state competition
will be efficient or inefficient by asking two questions about the statute.
First, does it give rise to the possibility of intra-firm externality by
allowing one corporate constituency (such as shareholders or managers)
to impose costs on another (such as creditors or rank and file
employees)? Second, does the statute give rise to the possibility of
interstate externality, by allowing one state to impose costs on the
102 See supranote 29 and accompanying text.
103 U.C.C. § 9-103 (1998).
104 Revised U.C.C. §§ 9-301, 9-307(e) ("A registered organization that is organized under the
law of a State is located in that State.").
105 Janger, Uniform Law Process,supra note 9, at 623-25.
106 See supra note 29.
107 Janger, Uniform Law Process, supra note 9, at 579-80; see also Lucian Arye Bebchuk,
Federalismand the Corporation: The DesirableLimits on State Competition in CorporateLaw,
105 HARV. L. REV. 1437 (1992).
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citizens of another state? Unfortunately, the Delaware ABS Statute 08
implicates both concerns. 109
First, the Delaware ABS Statute creates an opportunity for intrafirm externality. Like secured credit, securitization gives shareholders
and managers the power to shift risk to non-consensual and nonadjusting creditors such as tort claimants and employees of the
originator. But the risks of securitization go beyond those associated
with secured credit. Securitization seeks to insulate the securitized
Assets more effectively from the claims of an Originator's creditors.
This is not necessarily a problem for true true sale securitizations
(where the seller has truly parted with the asset, and received
consideration in return). But for those "non-true sale" securitizations
which would be insulated by the ABS Statutes, the use of the "sale"
form leads to a difference in treatment without a difference in substance.
Worse yet, state competition is particularly likely to lead to a race to the
bottom when it reduces the effect of market discipline on corporate
managers. 110 Legislation that reduces transparency allows incumbent
management to hide the costs of inefficient management decisions. As
noted above, the ABS Statutes give the officers of the Originator the
power to impose transparency costs on shareholders, through offbalance sheet accounting and reduced filing obligations. Securitization,
therefore, creates an opportunity for intra-firm externality.
Second, the Delaware ABS Statute"' creates an opportunity for
interstate externality. Under Article 9's choice of law rules, where
financial assets are involved, 112 the Originator need only be
incorporated in Delaware to take advantage of the Delaware ABS
Statute. 113 A plurality of American public companies incorporate in
Delaware. However, the employees, creditors, and shareholders who
are harmed by the Delaware ABS Statute are not, for the most part,
citizens of Delaware. For this reason, Delaware can benefit from the
franchise taxes associated with additional Delaware incorporations,
108 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 2703A(a)(1) (2003); see also supra note 29 and accompanying
text.
109 See Janger, Uniform Law Process, supra note 9, at 593.
110 See Bebehuck, supra note 107, at 1461. Bebchuck contends:
The effectiveness of market discipline ... varies greatly across issues. In particular,
there are two types of issues with respect to which market discipline can hardly be
relied on to induce managers to seek value-maximizing rules. These two types of
issues are those that are "significantly redistributive" and those that directly affect the
strength of market discipline.
Id.
111 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 2703A(a)(1); see also supra note 29 and accompanying text.
112 As noted above, see supra note 20, and elsewhere, Janger, supra note 9, at 625, the drafters
of Revised Article 9 limited the extent to which Article 9 increased the incentive to race to the
bottom by bifurcating the law governing perfection and the law governing effect of perfection for
tangible assets. However, the incentive still exists.
113 Revised U.C.C. §§ 9-301, 9-307(e); see also supra note 104 and accompanying text.
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while not bearing the cost of the inefficient legislation. 14
State competition and experimentation with regard to securitization
will more likely lead to a race to the bottom, rather than a race to the
top, and the Delaware ABS Statute fits the predicted pattern with
chilling precision. A state that can externalize costs appears to be
competing for incorporations by adopting a law that allows corporate
managers and shareholders to externalize risk.
V. THE NEED FOR A FEDERAL SOLUTION AND SOME ALTERNATIVES
In the preceding four sections, I have painted a picture of the
securitization movement, and the ABS Statutes 15 that should give
proponents of secured lending and Article 9 pause. The Delaware ABS
Statute, 16 if it works, creates an opportunity for lenders and borrowers
to opportunistically avoid the regulation of secured credit contained in
the perfection and foreclosure rules of Article 9. The doctrine of true
sale, which these statutes would abolish, operates as a protection against
risk alteration and transparency reducing securitizations. 11 7 These
effects of the Delaware statute are independent of any special treatment
under the Bankruptcy Code.
However, making these arguments to the Delaware (or South
Dakota, Ohio, Texas, Louisiana, North Carolina, or Alabama)
legislature(s) is unlikely to gain much headway. States which adopt
ABS statutes benefit from precisely the moral hazard that the doctrine
of true sale limits. Worse yet, as has been observed in the corporate law
area, as goes Delaware, so goes the nation. So, if the Delaware ABS
Statute is an example of a race to the bottom, the only way to solve the
problem is through federal law. In short, those who believe in secured
lending, and that Article 9's regulatory provisions matter should support
a federal override of the ABS Statutes, and a federal doctrine of "true
sale."
114 Indeed, the reach of the Delaware ABS Statute may be enhanced for securitized personal
property, other than accounts, chattel paper, promissory notes, and payment intangibles, because
Revised Article 1 increases the extent to which contractual choice of law clauses are enforceable,
even where the chosen law bears no relation to the transaction. Revised U.C.C. § 1-301 (2001).
Under that provision, in unconventional securitizations-where the SPV holds assets, the sale of
which are not governed by Article 9-debtors may, unless a state court decides that it violates a
fundamental policy, simply be able to opt into Delaware law, and thereby opt out of the doctrine
of true sale. This is by no means a certainty, however. Cases under UCC 1-105 held fairly
uniformly that choice of law clauses that implicated the sale/lease distinction were held
unenforceable because they implicated the rights of third parties. See, e.g., In re Eagle
Enterprises, 223 B.R. 290, 294-95 (Bkrtcy.E.D.Pa. 1998) (collecting cases).
115 See supra note 29.
116 See id. and accompanying text.
117 See discussion supra Part I.A.
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Such a solution can be reached either through federal legislation or
through judge-made law under current bankruptcy law.
A.

Statutory Solution

During the summer of 2002, a statutory override to the ABS
Statutes was proposed in Congress. Section 102 of the Durbin-Delahunt
Bill provided as follows:
(e)(1) Notwithstanding any otherwise applicable provision of law,
the court may recharacterize as a secured loan, a sale, lease, or
transaction if the material characteristics of the sale, lease, or
transaction are substantially similar to the characteristics of a secured
loan.
(2) Nothing in paragraph (1) shall be construed to modify, impair, or
supersede any other authority under federal or state law that the court
118
has to recharacterize a sale, lease, or transaction.
This provision, which would have federalized the law of "true
sale," was roundly criticized as an invasion of the province of state
law.' 19 A "report" signed by, among others, the reporters of Revised
Article 9 and some of the strongest proponents of securitization, shows
that the secured lending/securitization alliance is still holding together,
at least for these purposes. 120 However, the rhetoric of the response is
quite interesting, in that it may reveal that the marriage may no longer
be one of common interest. Rather than attack the substance of the
doctrine of "true sale," or the particular formulation (which might have
benefited from greater specificity), the critique was phrased as follows:
We do not question the proposition that a court should attempt to
characterize the economic substance of a transaction in determining
its appropriate character for purposes of applying bankruptcy law.
This happens regularly under current law by the application of well
established state laws. We do question, however, the wisdom of
statutorily federalizing this important issue of property law for
purposes of bankruptcy-at least without additional thought and
deliberation. We are aware that a very few states have enacted laws
that would permit true sale treatment for transactions without regard
to economic substance and we express no view on the merits of those
laws. Instead, we suggest that the question of the effectiveness of
those laws in bankruptcy be left to the courts in their determination
as to whether a conflicting federal interest exists, as Butner instructs.
Thus, to the extent that state law may create or lead to abuses from a
bankruptcy perspective, federal law already contains the cure. The
118 Employee Abuse Prevention Act of 2002, H.R. 5221, 107th Cong. § 102.
119 Durbin-Delahunt Report, supra note 7.
120 Id.
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proposed statutory fix is totally unnecessary, particularly given the
devastating impact that it would have on an industry that supplies
much needed capital to business enterprises both here and abroad.
State law, when examined in the bankruptcy context, for the most
21
part has proved workable and sensible. 1

This remarkable paragraph shows that the unified front may have a
few cracks. The paragraph starts by questioning the federalization of
the law of "true sale," because state courts can, do, and should apply the
doctrine as a matter of state common law. It then acknowledges the
existence of the ABS Statutes, but declines to criticize them,
notwithstanding their evident purpose of abolishing the true sale
doctrine just praised. Next, the authors state that a federal statute is
unnecessary because federal bankruptcy courts have the power, under
Butner v. United States, 122 to do precisely what the statute that they just
criticized does by overriding the ABS Statutes in the name of a federal
common law doctrine of "true sale." Finally, the authors state that the
federal statute would cause grievous injury to the securitization
industry, because it would give bankruptcy courts the power to do
something that in the previous sentence they said the bankruptcy courts
already had the power to do under current law. 123 This critique of
Durbin-Delahunt section 102124 is intriguing, not because what it says is
correct, but because it may point toward a division among the drafters
of the report, some of whom trace their roots to secured lending, some
of whom are advocates of securitization. It is almost as if each group
was given the opportunity to write a sentence, and the finished product
was not edited for logical consistency.
121 Id. at 23 (referring to Butner v. United States, 440 U.S. 48 (1979)).
122 440 U.S. 48 (1979).
123 The analysis hinges on Butner, a case where the Supreme Court unanimously inveighed
against bankruptcy rules that overrode state law property interests. The Burner Court reasoned as
follows:
The constitutional authority of Congress to establish "uniform Laws on the subject of
Bankruptcies throughout the United States" would clearly encompass a federal statute
defining the mortgagee's interest in the rents and profits earned by property in a
bankrupt estate. But Congress has not chosen to exercise its power to fashion any such
rule. The Bankruptcy Act does include provisions invalidating certain security
interests as fraudulent, or as improper preferences over general creditors. Apart from
these provisions, however, Congress has generally left the determination of property
rights in the assets of a bankrupt's estate to state law. Property interests are created
anddefined by state law. Unless some federal interestrequires a different result, there
is no reason why such interests should be analyzed differently simply because an
interested party is involved in a bankruptcy proceeding. Uniform treatment of
property interests by both state and federal courts within a State serves to reduce
uncertainty, to discourage forum shopping, and to prevent a party from receiving "a
windfall merely by reason of the happenstance of bankruptcy."
Butner, 440 U.S. at 54-55 (citing Lewis v. Mfrs. Nat'l Bank of Detroit, 364 U.S. 603, 609 (1961))
(emphasis added) (footnotes omitted).
124 See supra note 118 and accompanying text.
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Thus, the alliance between secured lending securitization may be
one of convenience, and habit, rather than interest. So long as it
persists, however, Section 102 of Durbin-Delahunt (or anything like it)
stands little chance of enactment, and the proponents of secured lending
may have unwittingly facilitated inefficient securitization at their own
expense.
B.

JudicialSolution

The Durbin-Delahunt Report's discussion of federal power1 25 does,
however, raise an even more interesting question. Was DurbinDelahunt 102 necessary at all? To what extent does current bankruptcy
law, and the existing Bankruptcy Code, give bankruptcy courts the
power to look past state law pronouncements of whether something is
property of the estate? At what point does § 541 preempt state property
law? Broadly speaking there are three points that a court could choose.
The first is the position articulated by David Carlson, that any retention
of an interest by the debtor is property of the estate, and sweeps the
property, in toto, into the estate. 126 The second is the position
articulated by most scholars, that transactions in the form of true sales
will be excluded from the bankruptcy estate, while transactions with the
substance of loans will be included. 127 Finally, there is the position
taken by the ABS Statutes. 28 These statutes state that regardless of
substance, if a transaction is labeled a "sale," it will be treated as one
under state law. To the extent that bankruptcy law respects state law,
potential debtors will have the power to exclude assets from their
bankruptcy estates simply by securitizing them.
Both the first and third options are problematic. Carlson's view
that any retained interest brings property into the estate must be
overbroad.
Putting aside the odd never-neverland world of
securitizations, there must be some boundary between loan and sale,
and certain sales must exclude the sold assets from the seller's
bankruptcy estate. For example, if the debtor was in the business of
selling cars, it would be bizarre to subject an automobile sold to a
consumer to turnover based on the fact that the purchaser might at some
indistinct point in the future avail him or herself of the right, under a
warranty or lemon law, to return the car. Indeed, even if the seller
retained a security interest, the seller's bankruptcy trustee could not
recover the car unless the buyer defaulted. While the secured loan
125 Durbin-Delahunt Report, supra note 7.
126 Carlson, supra note 41.

127 See, e.g., Pantaleco et al., supranote 33; Plank, supra note 54; Shupack, supra note 54.
128 See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
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would obviously be property of the estate, the car would not. On the
other hand, allowing states to gerrymander their property law at will
also seems undesirable, because in so doing states may permit their
debtors to override the Bankruptcy Code.
As undesirable as the third option may be, is there anything in
current federal law that stands in its way? In a number of contexts, the
Bankruptcy Code expressly defers to state law. Section 541(c)(2) 129
respects spendthrift trusts that are enforceable under state law. Section
522130 respects state exemption laws. Both provisions allow debtors
from particular states to opportunistically exclude property from their
estates. Indeed, Delaware and Alaska have revised their spendthrift
trust laws 131 to allow settlors of trusts to retain almost unfettered control
over the contents of those trusts, while nonetheless respecting the trusts
as spendthrift, and unreachable by creditors. 132 While these are clearly
judgment-proofing devices, no court has yet invalidated such a trust
under federal bankruptcy law. Moreover, the language of § 541(a), 133
by its terms appears to piggy-back on applicable non-bankruptcy law.
The estate consists of "all legal or equitable interests of the debtor in
property ... "134 What constitutes a legal or equitable interest turns on
non-bankruptcy law entitlements.
But there are two answers, one based in case law, the other based
in a structural reading of the Bankruptcy Code. First, the Supreme
Court's decision in United States v. Whiting Pools, 135 makes clear that
the legal or equitable interest need not be a possessory "property"
interest. 13 6 Even an unexercised right to redeem was sufficient to bring
property within the estate, and subject it to tumover. 13 7 Indeed, the
Court acknowledged that this gave the estate more rights than the debtor
would have had outside of bankruptcy, because the debtor could not
have recovered the property without paying off the creditor (the IRS).
This position is bolstered by the Supreme Court's recent decision in
United States v. Craft.138 In that case, the Supreme Court had to
determine whether a federal tax lien relating to the tax liability of one
129 11 U.S.C. § 541(c)(2) (2000).
130 Id. § 522.
131 See supra note 29, DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 12, §§ 3570-3576 (Supp. 1998); ALASKA STAT. §

34.40.110 (Michie 1998).
132 See sources cited supra note 131; see also Stewart E. Sterk, Asset Protection Trusts: Trust

Law's Race to the Bottom?, 85 CORNELL L. REv. 1035, 1037-39 (2000).
133 11 U.S.C. § 541(a).
134 Id. § 541(a)(1).
135 462 U.S. 198 (1983).
136 Id. at 204 n.8 (stating that the estate includes tangible as well as intangible property).
137 Id. at 207.

138 535 U.S. 274, 278 (2002) ("Whether the interests of respondent's husband in the property
he held as a tenant by the entirety constitutes 'property and rights to property' for the purposes of
the federal taxlien statute is ultimately a question of federal law.") (citation omitted).
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spouse attached to property held by a husband and wife by the
entireties. Under Michigan law, no lien could attach to entireties
property, yet the Supreme Court held that whether a spouse had a
"property" right that could be reached under the Tax Code was a matter
of federal law, not state law. Even though a lien could not attach to the
property, the husband had sufficient rights with regard to the entireties
140
property 139 to constitute property under the Internal Revenue Code.
What is striking is that the language in the section 6321 of the Internal
Revenue Code at issue in Craft is quite similar to § 541 of the
Bankruptcy Code.1 41 Section 26 U.S.C. 6321 provides:
If any person liable to pay any tax neglects or refuses to pay the
same after demand, the amount (including any interest, additional
amount, addition to tax, or assessable penalty, together with any
costs that may accrue in addition thereto) shall be a lien in favor of
the United States upon all property and rights to property, whether
142
real or personal,belonging to such person.

The Bankruptcy Code defines property of the estate as "all legal or
equitable interests of the debtor in property as of the commencement of
the case. ' 143 It seems entirely possible that the Supreme Court would
give similar meaning to the Bankruptcy Code's definition of property of
the estate, and would look past state law property definitions to
determine whether the state law rights constituted "property" under the
federal statute. Indeed, at least one lower federal Court has already
done so.144
139 The Court stated:
In determining whether respondent's husband possessed "property" or "rights to
property" within the meaning of [the federal tax lien statute], we look to the individual
rights created by these state law rules. According to Michigan law, respondent's
husband had, among other rights, the following rights with respect to the entireties
property: the right to use the property, the right to exclude third parties from it, the
right to a share of income produced from it, the right of survivorship, the right to
become a tenant in common with equal shares upon divorce, the right to sell the
property with the respondent's consent and to receive half the proceeds from such a
sale, the right to place an encumbrance on the property with the respondent's consent,
and the right to block respondent from selling or encumbering the property unilaterally.
id. at 282.
140 Id at 283. The Court observed:
The statutory language authorizing the tax lien "is broad and reveals on its face that
Congress meant to reach every interest in property that a taxpayer might have."
"Stronger language could hardly have been selected to reveal a purpose to assure the
collection of taxes." We conclude that the husband's rights in the entireties property
fall within this broad statutory language.
Id.(citations omitted).
141 11 U.S.C. § 541 (2000).
142 26 U.S.C. § 6321 (2000) (emphasis added).
143 11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(1).
144 At least one federal court has chosen to ignore a state ABS law providing that a transaction
denominated as "sale" will be treated as a "sale" regardless of its economic attributes. Reaves
Brokerage Co. v. Sunbelt Fruit & Vegetable Co., 336 F.3d 410 (5th Cir. 2003). Texas has a non-
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If federal common law is to create a definition of "property" for
the purposes of § 541, how should it be defined? What should shape its
contours? Ronald Mann, in his contribution to this Symposium,
suggests that § 541 's definition of property should preempt state statutes
that are what he calls "bankruptcy directed. 1' 45 In his view, any state
statute which reshapes state property law for the purposes of obtaining
better bankruptcy treatment for a particular class of creditors should be
deemed preempted by the Bankruptcy Code. 146 Mann's approach is,
however, overbroad, and difficult to administer. It is hard to imagine
that the drafters of the Bankruptcy Code intended to freeze property
definitions as they were in 1978, and would divest states of significant
power over property located in their own jurisdictions. I, by contrast,
would advocate a somewhat narrower, more functional, and to borrow a
term from Hanoch Dagan, more "realist"' 47 approach to the federal
limits to state law discretion to reshape their property law. States need
to be free to adjust their property law to serve local policies and local
interests. State environmental law may, for example, affect bankruptcy
priorities. Similarly, a state which adopted a lien in favor of tort
claimants might also affect bankruptcy priorities, or the shape of the
bankruptcy estate. Only where state competition will tend to lead state
property law to race to the bottom should Congress or the federal courts
reach out to preempt state property law. However, where, as with the
ABS Statutes, the risk of such a race to the bottom is palpable and
manifested, the argument for preemption is strong, and, that failing, the
need for federal legislation is acute.

uniform version of Section 9.109(e), which provides, in part:
For all purposes, in the absence of fraud or intentional misrepresentation, the parties'
characterization of a transaction as a sale of such assets [that is, accounts, chattel paper,
payment intangibles, or promissory notes] shall be conclusive that the transaction is a
sale and is not a secured transaction and that title, legal and equitable, has passed to the
party characterized as the purchaser of those assets regardless of whether the secured
party has any recourse against the debtor, whether the debtor is entitled to any surplus,
or any other term of the parties' agreement.
TX. Bus. & CoM. § 9.109(e) (2002). Nonetheless, in the Reaves case the Fifth Circuit held that
PACA, a federal statute, governed a factoring agreement deemed to evidence a secured loan, not
a sale, notwithstanding the Texas law to the contrary. Further support for such an argument
might be found in the Supreme Court's recent decision in Archer v. Warner, 538 U.S. 314 (2003)
(holding that where debtor settled a claim based in fraud in return for a promissory note, the
settlement did not operate as a waiver of the creditor's right to seek to have the debt found nondischargeable under 11 U.S.C. § 523). Thus, even in jurisdictions that have adopted ABS
Statutes, bankruptcy courts might not be bound by the party's characterization of their
transaction, particularly where that characterization involves the waiver of important rights in
bankruptcy.
145Ronald J. Mann, The Rise and Fallof Stale Bankruptcy DirectedLegislation, 25 CARDOZO
L. REV. 1805 (2004).
146 Id.

147 Hanoch Dagan, The Craft of Property, 91 CAL. L. REV. 1517, 1520 (2003).
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CONCLUSION

The purpose of this essay is not to argue for section 102 of DurbinDelahunt,148 or to claim that the Delaware ABS Statute 149 is preempted
by § 541 of the Bankruptcy Code. 150 Instead my claim is somewhat
more complicated, but also more limited. First, as a policy matter, state
law statutes which enable non-true sale securitizations encourage
inefficient transactions that are driven not by the value creating aspects
of securitization (liquidity enhancement and risk pooling), but by the
inefficient attributes of securitization (risk alteration and financial
Second, statutes which facilitate non-true sale
obfuscation).
securitizations encourage forum shopping away from secured lending
under Article 9, and toward disguised sales as the dominant method of
capital formation. Third, because Delaware can use its ABS Statute as a
means to attract Delaware incorporation, while externalizing the costs
of inefficient securitizations, we cannot count on jurisdictional
competition to act as a corrective for the inefficient Delaware ABS
Statute. Therefore, and this is my main point, those who care about the
health of secured lending as an institution, and about Article 9 as a
statute, should support a federal doctrine of true sale whether it is
adopted through statutory enactment, or as a matter of common law.

148 Employee Abuse Prevention Act of 2002, H.R. 5221, 107th Cong. § 102 see also supra
text accompanying note 118.
149 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 2703A(a)(1) (2003); see also supra note 29 and accompanying
text.
150 11 U.S.C. § 541 (2000).

